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Abstract
This article will review and analyze the background of the SCE provisions, the operation and
limitations of the current law as evidenced by recent cases, and the proposed legislation currently
before Congress.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States antidumping laws' are meant to protect
domestic industries from unfairly priced imports. 2 Dumping occurs when imported merchandise is sold at "less than fair value"
(LTFV) and an industry in the United.States is "materially injured,
or is threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an
industry in the United States is materially retarded by reason of'
*B.A. 1966, Lehigh University; J.D., M.B.A. 1970, Columbia University; Partner,
Shearman & Sterling.
"B.A. 1971, J.D. 1975, Harvard University; Associate, Shearman & Sterling.
The authors wish to acknowledge gratefully the assistance of Nancy Turck, B.A. 1968,
Brown University, J.D. 1978, Georgetown University, formerly an associate with Shearman
& Sterling and now with the law firm of Salah Hejailan, and Christopher de la Rama, B.A.
1978, Amherst College, a second year student at the Fordham University School of Law.
1. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-77 (Supp. III 1979). These sections are the present codification of
the original Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, §§ 201-212, 42 Stat. 11 (1921), 19 U.S.C. §§
160-173 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Antidumping Act], amended by Trade Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-618, Title III, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978, 2043-49 (1974) [hereinafter cited as the Trade
Act]. The Antidumping Act of 1921 was repealed by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19
U.S.C. §§ 1673-77 (Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as the Trade Agreements Act].
2. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRSS:
U.S. LAWS AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO IMPORTS FROM NONMARKET ECONOMIES COULD

BE IMPROVED (1981) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT]: "U.S. antidump-

ing law provides methods by which domestic industries can obtain relief from unfairly priced
imports that place them at a competitive disadvantage." Id. at 12. Cf. City Lumber Co. v.
United States, 290 F. Supp. 385 (Cust. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 311 F. Supp. 340 (Cust. Ct. 1970),
aff'd, 457 F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ("The intent of Congress was to protect domestic
industry from sales of imported merchandise at less than fair value which either caused or
continued an injury to competitive domestic producers of merchandise.
...
290 F. Supp.
at 392) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of this case's novel continuation of injury
theory of law, see Comment, Antidumping Act-Determination of Injury-Purposeful Importation at Depressed Market Price Held Prohibited Under Continuation of Injury Theory,
3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 376 (1970); see also Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 200
F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961). ("The history of the Antidumping Act ... makes it clear that
the concern of Congress was to protect the producers of the United States against actual or
threatened demoralization of American markets which could result from the exportation
from foreign countries of articles into the United States at prices less than the fair market
value of those articles.
...
Id. at 306).
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the imports in question. 3 As indicated by three recent antidumping
decisions of the Department of Commerce (Commerce) ,4 significant problems are encountered in determining if sales are being
made at LTFV in antidumping investigations involving products
from socialist and communist countries.
Under present Commerce practice, the determination in an
antidumping investigation of whether a country has a state-controlled economy (an SCE) might be compared to the celebrated
technique of defining pornography: I cannot define it, but I know it
when I see it.5 Although for certain purposes this subjectivity may
be desirable, in antidumping law it presents a difficult dilemma for
foreign producers whose products are the subject of an antidumping investigation. It is one thing for government regulators to determine that an economy is state-controlled; it is quite another for
producers subject to such determinations to determine pricing strategies and overcome the inherent disadvantages of offshore marketers. When SCE determinations take place, foreign producers cannot predict their exposure to charges of dumping their products nor
can they modify their practices to avoid such charges. The avoidance of sales at LTFV-the heart of antidumping law theory-is
seriously compromised to the detriment of both United States and
foreign producers.
The pluralistic structure of the economies of many nations
makes the determination of state control even more difficult., One
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979). See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note
2, at 12. This article addresses only that part of the statute concerning "fair value."
4. Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of China, 46 Fed. Reg. 3,258 (1981);
Unrefined Montan Wax from the German Democratic Republic, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,555 (1981);
Truck Trailer Axle-and-Brake Assemblies from the Hungarian People's Republic, 46 Fed.
Reg. 46,152 (1981).
5. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring: "I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.
... Id.).
6. Consider the case of Brazilian manufacturers who get an approximate thirty percent
drawback or credit on customs duties on Paraguayan peppermint oil if they re-export the
menthol it produces within six months. In addition, producers/exporters receive an export
incentive from the government of eight percent of the export value of menthol and twentyfour percent of the export value of dementholized peppermint oil. See GREENHALGH, THE
MARKET FOR MINT OILS AND MENTHOL 26 (1979). The export incentive can take any one of
five forms in Brazil, including an exemption from withholding tax paid on export commissions or exemption from excise tax. See PRICE WATERHOUSE & Co., DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL
88-89 (1980). Moreover, there is an exemption from excise and sales taxes on exported goods
with respect to income attributable to export sales. Id. at 89. See PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL
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might readily agree that the Soviet Union has an SCE, both as a
nation and on any industrial sector basis. Disagreements may arise,
however, when considering mixed political and economic systems
such as Yugoslavia or Hungary. A country may be "free-market" in
one sector of its economy but demonstrably "state-controlled" in
another sector. On a sectoral basis, even United States agriculture
might not escape the characterization of state control in certain
respects:
Although government price-support programs remain controversial in the United States, a majority of those in Congress have
voted in favor of continuing such programs over the past forty
years. Support programs in some form have been maintained
since the 1930's for most grains, cotton, tobacco, oil-seed crops,
wool, sugar, and milk. These commodities account for about
half the cash receipts of farmers in the United States. Prices of
commodities which account for the remaining half of gross farm
receipts, including poultry and eggs, beef, pork, fruits, and
vegetables, have not been supported directly, although the
prices of these commodities have been influenced by support
programs on grains, and to a modest degree by government
purchase programs and marketing orders for a few commodi7
ties.
Prompted by these problems and by the negative impact of the
current antidumping statutes on expanding United States trade
with countries that may potentially be labelled as SCEs,8 Congress
is considering a substantial revision 9 of the sections of the antidumping laws that deal with imports from SCEs (the "SCE provisions"). 1 This Article will review and analyze the background of
the SCE provisions, the operation and limitations of the current law
as evidenced by recent cases, and the proposed legislation currently
before Congress.
& CO., INTERNATIONAL TAX AND BUSINESS GUIDE TO BRAZIL 37-38 (1979). In these circum-

stances, home market sales are undoubtedly of little interest to Brazilian producers unless the
home market purchasers are willing to pay artificially high prices in order to match the tax
benefits enjoyed by exporters.
7. W. TOMEK & K. ROBINSON, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT PRICES 277 (1972). See also
Schwartz, American antitrust and tradingwith state-controlledeconomies, ANTITRUST BULLETIN 513, 514-15 (1980) (for a discussion of the ways in which the United States government
regulates economic activity).
8. See COMVMTOLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-5.
9. S. 958, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S3782 (daily ed. April 9, 1981)
(introduced by Sen. Heinz).
10. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (Supp. III 1979).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF SPECIAL SCE
PROVISIONS IN UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING LAW
A. The Reasons for SCE Provisions
and the Problems They Create
Antidumping investigations include a determination by Commerce of whether LTFV sales have taken place in a given period,
usually a period six months prior to the initiation of the investigation." To determine if LTFV sales have taken place, Commerce is
mandated by statute to compare the United States price of the
merchandise in question with its "foreign market value."' 2 If, for
example, the product being investigated comes from Canada and is
also sold in Canada in reasonable commercial quantities, the comparative process is relatively easy. If the United States price is lower
than the "home market price," then LTFV sales have occurred. If it
is equal or higher on an F.O.B. factory basis, no LTFV sales have
occurred and the antidumping investigation stops.
However, if the product originates from a country that arguably is "state-controlled," while the determination of the United
States price of the product in question may be relatively easy, the
issue of determining the "foreign market value" for purposes of
comparison to the United States price is highly problematic. Where
11. The investigation is initiated by the filing of a petition or by Commerce itself. When
a petition is filed, Commerce shall, within twenty days of filing, determine whether the
petition alleges the elements for the imposition of an antidumping duty (the amount by which
the foreign market value exceeds the United States price) and contains information reasonably available to the petitioner supporting the allegations. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a (Supp. III 1979).
Simultaneously, the International Trade Commission (ITC) is notified of an investigation by
the filing of the petition or by Commerce. Within forty-five days of filing or initiation the
ITC determines whether there exists a reasonable indication of material injury, a threat
thereof or material retardation of the establishment-of an industry in the United States by
reason of the imports. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (Supp. III 1979).
In order to conform to the Trade Agreements Act, supra note 1, and Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1979, in 1980 the International Trade Administration of the Department of
Commerce (ITA) assumed responsibility for antidumping investigations. 45 Fed. Reg. 8,182,
35,803 (1980). The Customs Service of the Treasury Department formerly had been responsible for antidumping determinations.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979). See generally Note, Treasury Runs the Maze:
Less Than Fair Value DeterminationsUnder the Antidumping Act of 1921, 8 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 919 (1978) (detailed analysis of LTFV determination procedure). For a review of
antidumping investigation procedures in general, see Victor, United States Antidumping
Rules, 10 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 217 (1978). For a somewhat outdated but still useful detailed
analysis of the criteria used in determining the existence of LTFV sales, see Baier, Substantive
Interpretations Under the Antidumping Act and the Foreign Trade Policy of the United
States, 17 STAN. L. REv. 409 (1965).
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an SCE is involved, the producer's "home market" price is not
utilized, and various alternative formulas are employed.1 3 The
unwillingness to use the SCE's home market price results from the
are artificial and do not
theory that prices and markets in an SCE
4
value."
market
"foreign
fair
a
reflect
The impact of not using the foreign producer's home market
price as the foreign market value because of an SCE designation is
very significant. The initial problem is inability to predict the
outcome of Commerce's LTFV determination. Potential United
States petitioners find it difficult to predict their chances of success
and may be discouraged from seeking relief. Similarly, the foreign
producer does not have the data to make a fair-value comparison
and thus determine if a problem exists. Dumping cannot be avoided
if the rules and the numbers of the game are not known to the
players. That circumstance has several ramifications. Settlement by
virtue of an agreement not to sell at LTFV is at least delayed, if not
denied, as a possibility. Most important, the foreign producer is no
longer in control of his destiny as a marketer to the United States.
This is because his United States price will, under current law, be
compared in the LTFV determination to another producer's price
in that producer's home market or a third country, or to the United
States itself, as a replacement or "surrogate" for the home market
price in the SCE. It becomes impossible to determine if one's price
is, or will be, high enough to avoid the LTFV designation.
Worse yet, one's United States price can, in effect, be dictated
by a competitor's price if a competitor is chosen as a surrogate for
5
the SCE, as is often the case under recent Commerce practice.'
13. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (Supp. III 1979); 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1980).
14. See infra notes 24-72 and accompanying text. See also S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7311 (accompanying
the Trade Act, supra note 1). "The Committee is concerned that the technical rules in the
[Trade] Act are insufficient to counteract dumping from State-controlled-economy countries
where the supply and demand forces do not operate to produce prices, either in the home
market or in third countries, which can be relied upon for comparison purposes." Id.
15. See, e.g., Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of China, 46 Fed. Reg. 3,258
(1981); Truck Trailer Axle-and-Brake Assemblies from the Hungarian People's Republic, 46
Fed. Reg. 46,152 (1981). Another curious by-product of choosing a surrogate is the difficulty
in applying the "critical circumstances" provisions. These provisions are designed to subject
the importation of goods found to be sold at LTFV to withholding of appraisement at an
earlier stage in an antidumping investigation if the imports are "massive" and either (1) the
foreign producer or the importer "knew or should have known" the sales were at LTFV or
(2) there is a history of dumping. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(e) (Supp. III 1979). If a surrogate is
used it is difficult to envisage a circumstance where the foreign producer or the importer
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Comparative economic cost advantages cannot be realized, even
though the concept of comparative advantage is at the foundation
of international trade theory. In addition, because United States
importers will be liable under the statutory scheme for antidumping duties if there are LTFV sales after a certain date, the uncertainty and lack of predictability dries up markets and makes longterm contracting difficult, if not impossible. In view of these
practical commercial problems, foreign producers from countries
susceptible to designation as SCEs are at a distinct competitive
disadvantage.
B. The Pre-1968 Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
The original Antidumping Act of 1921 (Antidumping Act)1
contained no provision dealing specifically with SCEs. At that time
the Soviet Union had the only communist government, and United
States antidumping law did not indicate that communist or socialist
countries were to be treated differently from other countries. The
Antidumping Act provided that the existence of sales of merchandise at LTFV should be determined by a comparison of United
States import price and foreign market value or, in the absence of
such value, the "constructed value." 17 Generally, foreign market
value was defined as the price at which the merchandise was sold
for home consumption in the exporting country in the ordinary
course of trade.1 8 If that price could not be determined, the price
"knew or should have known" of sales at LTFV. The United States petitioner has little hope
of employing "critical circumstances" unless there is a history of dumping. For an example of
unsuccessful attempts to assert "critical circumstances," see Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of China, 46 Fed. Reg. 3,258 (1981) (preliminary LTFV determination), 46
Fed. Reg. 24,614 (1981) (final LTFV determination); Haarmann & Reimer Corp. v. United
States, No. 81-1-00027, slip op. February 2, 1981 (denying application of Haarmann &
Reimer Corp. for preliminary injunction in litigation challenging Commerce's denial of
critical circumstances). See also Unrefined Montan Wax from the German Democratic
Republic, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,555 (1981) (final LTFV determination holding that absence of
other history of dumping suggested no "reasonable basis to believe that importers knew, or
should have known, that the GDR exporter was selling Montan Wax at less than fair value.").
Id. at 38,566.
16. Antidumping Act, supra note 1.
17. Id. at §§ 201-06, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-65 (1964).
18. Id. at § 205, 19 U.S.C. § 164 (1964). That section of the Antidumping Act defined
foreign market value as:
the price, at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, at
which such or similar merchandise is sold or, in the absence of sales, offered for sale
in the principal markets of the country from which exported, in the usual wholesale
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at which such merchandise was sold for exportation to countries
other than the United States was taken to be the foreign market
value.19 Constructed value, which was to be used in the event that
foreign market value could not be determined, was measured by
the sum of the cost of materials and fabrication plus an amount for
expenses and profit.20 Again, these factors were to be considered to
the extent that they occurred in the ordinary course of business or
2
trade. 1
Thus the original statutory provisions provided that the preferred sources for values in foreign market value determinations
were:
(1) home market sales,
(2) sales to third countries, or
(3) constructed value (based on costs in the home economy).
Based on these provisions of the Antidumping Act, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), which was at that time responsible for conducting antidumping investigations, 22 promulgated procedural regulations.2 3 Although the Treasury antidumping
quantities and in the ordinarycourse of trade for home consumption (or, if not sold
or offered for sale for home consumption, of if the Secretary determines that the
quantity sold for home consumption is so small in relation to the quantity sold for
exportation to countries other than the United States as to form an inadequate basis
for comparison, then the price 'at which so sold or offered for sale for exportation to
countries other than the United States) ....
Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Section 206(a) of the Antidumping Act, supra note 1, described how the constructed
value was to be determined:
[T]he constructed value of imported merchandise shall be the sum of(1) the cost of materials . ..and of fabrication or other processing of any kind
employed in producing such or similar merchandise .. .which would ordinarily
permit the production of that particular merchandise in the ordinary course of
business;
(2) an amount for general expenses and profit equal to that usually reflected in
sales of merchandise of the same general class or kind as the merchandise under
consideration which are made by producers in the country of exportation, in the
usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade ....
Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Antidumping investigations are now conducted by the Department of Commerce.
See supra note 11.
23. 19 C.F.R. §§ 14.6-13 (1967). Specifically, Section 14.7 defined "fair value" in the
same way that "foreign market value" is defined in the statutory provisions, although Section
14.7, n.15 stated that the "definition of fair value does not in any way modify or affect
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regulations did not contain explicit provisions dealing with SCEs,
Treasury developed a special policy whereby, for any communist
country except Yugoslavia, home market prices were not used to
24
determine the foreign market value of products.
C. Pre-1968 Cases Dealing With SCE Designations
Treasury's earliest antidumping decisions involving SCEs
seemed to consider, to some extent, the use of home market prices.
None of these decisions, however, was finally decided solely on the
basis of a comparison between United States price and home market price. For example, in Bicycles from Czechoslovakia,2 5 Treasury
determined that the proper foreign value comparison was between
the United States price and either the home market price or constructed value. Treasury in fact used both home market price and
constructed value and found the United States price to be lower
than either,2 although the published decision failed to explain
what measure of constructed value was used.
Similarly, in Fur Felt Hoods, Bodies, and Caps from Czechoslovakia,27 Treasury appeared to consider home market prices but
found that sales for home market consumption were inadequate to
furnish a satisfactory basis for an LTFV comparison. 2 8 Treasury
therefore used a test that compared United States price with the
prices at which similar merchandise from competing third countries
was sold to the United States. 2 The "third country price" test
applied in Fur Felt Hoods was unusual since Treasury used the
definitions of foreign market value given in .. .the Antidumping Act." In addition, note 15
indicates that:
[a]n industry in the United States which considers that it is being injured by sales of
merchandise at less than fair value will ordinarily have insufficient information on
which to submit proof either of fair value ... or foreign market value or constructed value .... The industry may, however, submit .. .such material as is
available to it, including information indicating the market price for similar merchandise in the country of exportation and in any third countries in which merchandise of the producer complained of is known to be sold.

Id.
24. See Anthony, The American Response to Dumping From Capitalistand Socialist
Economies-SubstantivePremises, and Restructured ProceduresAfter the 1967 GATT Code,
54 CORNELL L. REv. 159, 200-05 (1969).
25. 25 Fed. Reg. 6,657 (1960).
26. Id.
27. 27 Fed. Reg. 6,099 (1962).

28. Id.
29. Id.
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price of similar merchandise sold to the United States from third
countries, rather than the price at which similar merchandise was
sold to other countries from Czechoslovakia. Treasury regulations
did not provide for the use of a "third country price" until they
were amended in 1968.30
A similar procedure was followed in Jalousie-Louvre-Sized
Sheet Glass from Czechoslovakia,3 1 in which there were neither
home market sales nor exports of comparable Czech sheet glass to
countries other than the United States. Treasury determined that:
Under these circumstances, a comparison between the purchase
price paid by the importer in the United States and the constructed value, as defined in the Antidumping Act of 1921, was
deemed appropriate.
In the absence of information as to the actual costs of
materials and labor and as to the amount ordinarily added for
general expenses and profit in Czechoslovakia, the constructed
value was calculated on the basis of the Western European
price, f.o.b. shipping port, for exportation to the United States,
jalousies exported
of glass jalousies most nearly similar to the
32
from Czechoslovakia to the United States.
As in the Fur Felt Hoods case, Treasury resorted to a third
country price to make its LTFV determination. Although use of this
value was not authorized, 33 it seems that Treasury was left with no
alternative because the circumstances of the Czech Sheet Glass case
were not anticipated in the statutory or regulatory provisions.
34
If a lack of cost information as in the Czech Sheet Glass case
can be assumed, Treasury's heavy reliance on a third country price
rather than the constructed value in subsequent decisions can be
explained. Of course, reasons for rejection of home market price
and normal third country price (sales from the SCE country to third
countries) must also be assumed in those cases where no such reasons were stated by Treasury.

30. 19 C.F.R. § 53.5(b) (1969) (merchandise from controlled-economy country). See
infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
31. 27 Fed. Reg. 8,457 (1962).
32. Id.
33. For a discussion of Treasury's "unauthorized" use of the third country price, see
Anthony, supra note 24, at 200-05.
34. 27 Fed. Reg. 8,457 (1962).
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Another possible explanation for Treasury's primary reliance
on third country price is suggested by the Portland Cement from
Poland case, 35 where use of home market sales was rejected because
such sales were "not made in the ordinary course of trade within the
meaning of the statute [the Antidumping Act of 1921]. '' 3' To use
home market sales or sales to third countries as a basis for an LTFV
comparison, such sales must be made "in the ordinary course of
trade."' 37 Furthermore, the costs used in calculating a constructed
value must also occur "in the ordinary course of trade" or "in the
ordinary course of business." ' 38 Thus, if Treasury assumed in a case
involving an SCE that home market sales, sales to third countries,
and the costs considered in calculating a constructed value did not
would have
occur in the ordinary course of trade, a foundation
39
been laid for consistent use of third country price.
Unfortunately, Treasury often did not explicitly state its reasons for rejecting home market sales, sales to third countries and
constructed value, and as a consequence the decisions seem inconsistent and haphazard. 40 For example, in Portland Cement from
35. 28 Fed. Reg. 6,660 (1963).
36. Id.
37. The phrase "ordinary course of trade" is incorporated into both the provision for
home market price, 19 C.F.R. § 14.7(1) (1967), § 57.3(a) (1969), § 353.3 (1980) by reference
to § 205 of the Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. § 164 (1964), and the provision for sales to third
countries (19 C.F.R. § 14.7(2) (1967), § 53.4(a) (1969), § 353.4 (1980) by reference to § 206 of
the Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1964)). See supra note 18.
38. Antidumping Act, supra note 1, at § 206, 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1964). See supra note 20.
39. Professor Anthony suggests this perception as the explanation of Treasury's behavior: "[b]ecause any available figures reflect transactions that are not 'in the ordinary course,'
the Treasury has no choice but to disregard figures from the exporting economy and simply to
do the best it can to construct the value in some other manner consistent with the spirit of the
[Antidumping] Act." Anthony, supra note 24, at 203-04. Anthony adds that the statutory
definition of constructed value did not specify how the Treasury was to proceed either when
information as to costs, expenses and profits was unavailable or when that information
reflected transactions that were not in the ordinary course. Id. at 204, n.188. Further,
according to Anthony, § 53.5 of the 1968 Treasury amendments did not close the gap. Id. See
infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
See also Coudert, The Application of the United States Antidumping Law in the Light of
a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 225-26 (1965) ("the [Treasury] Department
has concluded that it may reject all the elements of constructed value under Section 206(a) [of
the Antidumping Act] and apply the 'best evidence available' under Section 206(b), which it
has determined to be the export prices of similar goods from free market countries other than
the United States").
40. See the recommendations of the Comptroller General, infra notes 184-94 and
accompanying text. See also Schwartz, The Administration by the Department of the Treasury of the Laws Authorizing the Imposition of Antidumping Duties, 14 VA. J. INT'L LAW
463 (1974). The author suggests that Treasury decisions should contain an explicit statement
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Poland,4' after rejecting use of home market sales because they
were not made in the ordinary course of trade, Treasury rejected
sales to third countries because they were inadequate, and did not
42
state why third country price was chosen over constructed value.
The relative lack of judicial review during this period probably
contributed to the relative freedom with which Treasury applied its
own techniques to each situation.
Not only did Treasury's subsequent decisions choose third
country price consistently and with little or no explanation, the
decisions also referred to this price as the "constructed value."
Illustrative of this confusing use of terminology are the Window
44
Glass from U.S.S.R. 43 and Window Glass from Czechoslovakia
cases, where Treasury, without explanation, stated: "it was determined from the evidence presented that the proper comparison for
fair value purposes is between purchase price and constructed
value .... ,,4- The measure of constructed value used by Treasury,
however, was actually a third country price. 46 While this use of
the term "'constructed value" was inaccurate, it anticipated subsequent statutory 47 and regulatory 48 amendments which provided for
use of a constructed value based on third country prices in the case
of an SCE.
Treasury's decisions between 1964 and 1968 involving SCEs
seem to anticipate the 1968 amendments to the Treasury regulaof reasons which makes manifest the issues presented and the disposition made of them. Id. at
463, 473-74.
41. 28 Fed. Reg. 6,660 (1963).
42. Id.
43. 29 Fed. Reg. 8,381 (1964).
44. 29 Fed. Reg. 13,405 (1964). See also Coudert, supra note 39, at 226:
the legal validity of the Treasury Department's use of West European export prices
as the Czech constructed value was challenged in [this case] as contrary to the
legislative history and the actual language of Section 206(b) [of the Antidumping
Act] ....
The Treasury Department persisted in its position-notwithstanding the submission by the Czech exporter of all the elements of value required by Section
206(a) . . . . It recognized a possible legal problem in its declared'policy but chose
to continue the policy 'in the absence of a court decision overruling it.' Inasmuch as
the Czech Sheet Glass case terminated in a finding of no injury, the legal questions
underlying Treasury policy in this area [remained unresolved].
Id. (footnotes omitted).
45. 29 Fed. Reg. 8,381, 13,405 (1964).
46. Id.
47. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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tions. 4 Thus two 1966 cases involving Czechoslovakia, Shoes from
Czechoslovakia5 0 and Fur Felt Hat Bodies from Czechoslovakia,51
both used the third country price. In addition, Treasury first used
"controlled economy" language in the Fur Felt Hat case: "Comparison between purchase price and constructed value based on comparable hat bodies from a country not having a controlled economy ....
",
This decision came only eleven months before
Treasury's Proposed Rules which contained the new "Merchandise
53
from controlled economy country" provision.
Similar decisions were rendered in Fishery Products from
U.S.S.R. 54 (the first Treasury decision to name a specific country,
Kuwait, as the basis for a third country price), Pig Iron from
Czechoslovakia55 (use of price of comparable pig iron sold for home
consumption in countries not having an SCE), and Cast Iron Soil
Pipe and Fittings from Poland56 (where there were no sales for
home consumption in a non-SCE, the price chosen for comparison
purposes was the export price from France). By early 1968, Treasury apparently was completely at ease with its method of making
fair-value determinations based on procedures that were not to be
incorporated into its own regulations for several months. Typical
language appeared in Pig Iron from Czechoslovakia,57 Pig Iron
from East Germany,58 Pig Iron from Romania,"' Pig Iron from the
U.S.S.R. 0 and Titanium Sponge from the U.S.S.R.: 61
It was determined that the appropriate comparison for fair
value purposes is between purchase price and constructed
value...
49. These amendments, as described below in section II D, provided that in the case of
merchandise from a controlled economy, constructed value could be based on the price in a
third country, either (1) for home consumption, or (2) for export to another country,
including the United States. 19 C.F.R. § 53.5(b) (1969).
50. 31 Fed. Reg. 1,207 (1966).
51. 31 Fed. Reg. 15,024 (1966).
52. Id.
53. See supra note 49.
54. 32 Fed. Reg. 1,101 (1967). While the choice of Kuwait as a surrogate for the Soviet
Union may seem unlikely, there is a rationale. The fishery products in question originated
from the same waters as those sold by the Kuwaiti producers.
55. 32 Fed. Reg. 2,901 (1967).
56. Id.
57. 33 Fed. Reg. 5,105 (1968).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 5,106.
61. Id. at 5,467.
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inasmuch as the merchandise under consideration was produced
in a state-controlled-economy country, constructed value was
based on the ex-factory prices at which similar merchandise was
sold for home consumption in a free-economy country. The
country chosen for this purpose was Italy. [The United Kingdom
was used in the Titanium Sponge case. ]62

Four cases involving Yugoslavia
the preceding discussion. 63 In three
although presumably dealing with an
for determining foreign market value.

are somewhat anomalous to
of the four cases Treasury,
SCE,04 used normal methods
Home market price was used

62. Id. at 5,106.
63. For a thorough discussion of the Yugoslav cases, see Anthony, supra note 24, at 21326.
64. This presumption, of course, may be incorrect. Yugoslavia is widely considered, and
considers itself, to be a communist country with a market economy. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPorT, supra note 2, at 18-19. The reasons set forth are:
Economic decisions are made at the enterprise level, with little or no direct government influence . . . . Key features of Yugoslavia's self-management socialism are
(a) worker ownership of enterprises, (b) economic decisionmaking assigned and
restricted to individuals directly affected by the decision, (c) direct exercise of
power by these individuals without intermediaries (i.e., a managerial class or the
state), and (d) operation of firms to earn profits.
The national economic plan is "indicative" rather than binding-it imposes no legal
or mandatory obligations on individual enterprises.
National and state annual budgets are public documents (the U.S. Embassy in
Belgrade prepares an English-language translation and line item analysis annually)
and the local media reports parliamentary debate on these budgets.
The dinar, while not used in foreign trade transactions, can be valued in terms of
convertible currencies and a market exchange rate exists which is a fairly reliable
reflector of its value.
Capital markets tend to be regional, not national, and the self-managed banking
sector has considerable competence and autonomy in allocating investment resources.
Yugoslav enterprises publish annual reports disclosing income statements, balance
sheets, and other operating data using accounting principles very similar to those
generally used in the United States.
Id. However accurate this analysis may be, Treasury did not publish this type of discussion at
the time the decisions were made, and, therefore, did not help to alleviate the confusion they
engendered. In a subsequent case, Animal Glue and Inedible Gelatin from Yugoslavia, 42
Fed. Reg. 39,288 (1977), Treasury stated that Yugoslavia did not have a state-controlled
economy for the purposes of the Antidumping Act. See injra note 83. However, no basis was
given for this determination in the published decision. In this regard, see the recommendations in the COMPTROLLER GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 2, discussed infra notes 184-94 and
accompanying text.
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in both Portland Cement from Yugoslavia 5 and Wooden Coat
Hangersfrom Yugoslavia 6 and a normal constructed value (based
on costs in the Yugoslav economy) was used in Headboardsfrom
Yugoslavia.67 Copper Sheets from Yugoslavia8 is perhaps the most
confusing decision, since although the country involved was Yugoslavia, the value used was home market price in third countries, a
value that was used only in determinations involving SCEs. Sales
price to third countries is not mentioned as a possible alternative in
the Copper Sheets investigation, and no explanation for this omission is offered. For the first time in these pre-1968 cases, the value
chosen was home market price in Western European countries. 9
Once again, this value was not provided for in the original statutory
or regulatory provisions, but found its way into the 1968 amendments.7 0 Treasury also noted that the sales in question were between unrelated persons, 7 ' which ordinarily would mean that Treasury would not disregard a constructed value as reflected by third
country transaction prices. In fact, Treasury went to the trouble of
calculating the constructed value (which produced a similar negative LTFV determination), but then stated that this procedure was
not controlling. 72 One explanation for this multifaceted approach
is that Treasury was trying to satisfy as many of the interested
parties as possible. Since it did not make a difference to the LTFV
determination which value was used, Treasury decided to explain
that both values were considered.
D. A More Explicit Approach:
The 1968 Treasury Regulations
In 1968 Treasury promulgated a new provision dealing explicitly with SCEs, which provided:
Merchandisefrom controlled economy country. Ordinarily, if
the information available indicates that the economy of the
country from which the merchandise is exported is controlled to

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

27
28
30
29

Id.

Fed.
Fed.
Fed.
Fed.

Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.

41 (1962).
2,952 (1964).
8,016 (1965).
8,149 (1964).

19 C.F.R. § 53.5(b) (1969). See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.6
29 Fed. Reg. 8,149 (1964).

Id.

1982]

ROADBLOCK TO TRADE

an extent that sales or offers of sales of such or similar merchandise in that country or to countries other than the United States
do not permit a determination of fair value under § 53.3 or §
53.4, the Secretary will determine fair value on the basis of the
constructed value of the merchandise determined on the normal
costs, expenses and profits as reflected by the prices at which
such or similar merchandise is sold by a non-state-controlled
economy country either (1) for consumption in its own market;
73
or (2) to other countries, including the United States.

The primary purpose of the 1968 amendments was to conform
the United States antidumping regulations to the provisions of the
International Antidumping Code (the Code). r

'

The Code in turn

interprets Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and elaborates rules for its application. 75 However,
certain provisions in the amendments were added "to reflect current Treasury Department interpretation or practice. ' 76 Treasury
stated that the provision regarding SCEs fell into this latter category. 77 While the new provision apparently reflected existing
Treasury practice, there was still no statutory authority for such an
7
amendment.
Cases arising after the 1968 amendments to the Treasury regulations and before the statutory reform in 1974 apparently presented little difficulty. Treasury employed uniform language noting
that the exporting country had a controlled economy, and, therefore, the fair value would be determined by comparing purchase
price with third country price either for home consumption or
73. 19 C.F.R. § 53.5(b) (1969). The 1968 amendments to the antidumping procedures
were proposed October 28, 1967 (32 Fed. Reg. 14,955), adopted June 1, 1968 (33 Fed. Reg.
8,244), and took effect July 1, 1968. The former antidumping procedures, §§ 14.6-14.13,
were deleted, and the new procedures codified at 19 C.F.R. §§ 53.1-53.64 (1969). The
previous methods of calculating foreign market value in non-SCE situations remained intact
in the new regulations. 19 C.F.R. §§ 53.3-53.5(a) (1969). Provisions for home market value
(§ 53.3), sales to third countries (§ 53.4), and constructed value based on costs in the home
economy (§ 53.5(a)) remained unchanged.
74. 32 Fed. Reg. 14,955 (1967). Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431, 651 U.N.T.S. 320 (entered into force July 1, 1968, reprinted in 32
Fed. Reg. 14,955, 14,962 (1967) and 6 I.L.M. 920 (1967)).
75. 32 Fed. Reg. 14,955 (1967).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. In 1970 Part 53 of 19 C.F.R. was redesignated Part 153, with no textual change. 35
Fed. Reg. 9,271 (1970).
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export. 79 Treasury gave no indication of whether it had carried out
an analysis of whether or not the country or the industrial sector
involved was an SCE.
E. The Trade Act of 1974: Statutory Reform
The first statutory provision dealing with SCEs80 was added to
the Antidumping Act by the Trade Act of 1974 (the Trade Act). 8'
The new provision affirmed the Treasury regulations and gave
Treasury the additional alternative of considering "the constructed
value of such or similar merchandise in a non-state-controlled economy country or countries as determined under section [206 of the
Act]." ' 82 Thus, Treasury's options were all third country prices:
home market, export or constructed value.
F. Electric Golf Cars from Poland:
Statutory and Regulatory Reform
Cases arising between 1975 and 1978, with one exception,
were handled routinely under the regulatory provisions.8 3 The one
exception, involving golf cars from Poland, presented serious diffi-

79. See, e.g., Cast Iron Soil Pipe Fittings from Poland, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,338 (1971), 37
Fed. Reg. 12,978 (1972); Hat Bodies of Fur, Not on Skin, from Czechoslovakia, 36 Fed. Reg.
14,483 (1971); Welt Work Shoes from Romania, 39 Fed. Reg. 10,002 (1974); Electric Golf
Cars from Poland, 39 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (1974).
80. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321(a), 88 Stat. 2043 (1975) amending § 205 of the Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. § 164 (1976).
81. Trade Act, supra note 1. For a general discussion on changes made in practices and
procedures by the Trade Act, see Myerson, A Review of CurrentAntidumping Procedures:
United States Law and the Case of Japan, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 167 (1976).
82. 19 U.S.C. § 164 (1976). Although the House and Senate Reports accompanying the
provision asserted that it was intended to adopt existing Treasury regulations, H.R. REP. No.
571, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. 72 (1973); S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEws 7,186, 7,311, those regulations did not
include the use of a constructed value. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
83. The provision for use of a constructed value in a non-state-controlled economy,
added by the Trade Act (see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text), was not utilized. The
decisions were made using prices for either home consumption or export in third countries.
See, e.g., Clear Sheet Glass from Romania, 41 Fed. Reg. 14,909 (1976); Animal Glue and
Inedible Gelatin from Yugoslavia, 42 Fed. Reg. 4,921, 4,922 (1977). In the Inedible Gelatin
case, however, Treasury subsequently used home market prices in Yugoslavia since it was
determined that "the economy of Yugoslavia is not state-controlled to an extent that sales or
offers of sales of such or similar merchandise in Yugoslavia do not permit a determination of
foreign market value under section 205(a) of the [Antidumping] Act (19 U.S.C. 164(a))." 42
Fed. Reg. 39,288 (1977).
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culties under the regulatory and statutory provisions, and, in fact,
84
prompted their amendment.
In Electric Golf Carsfrom Poland,85 United States manufacturers of electric golf cars complained that golf cars from Poland
were being sold in this country at LTFV. 8 Accordingly, Treasury
carried out its dumping investigation using the constructed value of
golf cars in Canada, 87 the only country other than Poland and the
88
United States that produced golf cars in sufficient quantities.
Problems arose in 1975 after the Canadian producer ceased to
manufacture golf cars. 89 Since Poland was deemed a controlled

economy country, under its regulations Treasury could use only
United States prices or constructed value because no other country
manufactured the product.9 0 The Polish producer urged Treasury
not to use United States price or constructed value."1 The Poles
asserted that exports are possible only where the producing country
achieves cost savings relative to the importing nation, and that,
therefore, use of United States values would effectively preclude
them from the United States market.92 The Poles were not producing for a home market and the United States market appeared to be
the primary target of the Polish production.

84. See Note, Dumping from 'Controlled Economy' Countries: The Polish Golf Car
Case, 11 LAW & PoL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 777 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Dumping from
'Controlled Economy' Countries].
85. 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497 (1975).
86. See Dumping from 'ControlledEconomy' Countries, supra note 84, at 778.
87. 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497 (1975). The problems encountered in using the Canadian
constructed value were complicated and numerous. See Dumping from 'Controlled Economy' Countries, supra note 84, at 785-86. For example, the Polish producer urged Customs to
reduce the fair value, which had been calculated from Canadian prices, to adjust for relative
economies of scale. Id. at 786. The United States petitioner, on the other hand, found no
statutory basis for such an adjustment, and argued that Customs should restrict its adjustments to those set out in the statute. Id. Despite this lack of clear statutory authority, and
with no reason stated in the published decision, Treasury granted an adjustment for economies of scale. Id. The investigation resulted in a sales at LTFV finding. 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497
(1975).
88. Dumping from 'ControlledEconomy' Countries, supra note 84, at 784 n.61.
89. Id. at 784, 787.
90. In 1976 Treasury amended its regulations to conform to the statutory provisions of
the Trade Act and to explicitly provide for the use of United States price or constructed value
"where sales or offers for sale of such or similar merchandise in any other non-state-controlled-economy country do not provide an adequate basis for comparison." 41 Fed. Reg.
26,203, 26,205 (1976).
91. Dumpingfrom 'ControlledEconomy' Countries, supra note 84, at 788.
92. Id. at 788 n.93.
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In response to these concerns,9 3 Treasury once again amended
its regulations, which have remained in force to this day.9 4 The
current regulations95 establish a hierarchy of values to be used in
computing foreign market value; most preferred are prices (either
home market or export) or constructed value in a non-SCE country
which produces merchandise similar to that in question, and which
is at a stage of economic development comparable to that of the
SCE country. 96 Comparability of economic development is determined from "generally recognized criteria, including per capita
gross national product and infrastructure development (particu97
larly in the industry producing such or similar merchandise).
Considered next are prices or constructed value in a non-controlledeconomy country which produces merchandise similar to that in
question but which does not have a comparable economy.9 8 As an
alternative, if no non-state-controlled economy country of comparable economic development produces such or similar merchandise,
use may be made of a constructed value determined by costs, in the
SCE, of specific objective components or factors of production. Q
Such components or factors include hours of labor required, quantities of raw materials employed, and amounts of energy consumed.100 This information must be obtained from the producer of
the merchandise in the SCE under investigation, and verified to the

93. Id. at 788, 803. The extent of Treasury's responsiveness can be measured by the
February 21, 1978 letter sent by Pezetel, the Polish producer of golf cars, to the Commissioner of Customers, which stated:
PEZETEL welcomes the initiative of the U.S. Treasury Department to issue
the new regulations (published in the January 9, 1978, issue of the Federal Register),
which according to the declarations delivered by the American Side during the
Warsaw Session of the Polish American Commission for Trade and President Carter's visit to Poland, is intended to eliminate the concern of the Polish Side that the
existing Regulations are handicapping Polish exports into the USA.
94. 43 Fed. Reg. 35,263 (1978).
95. In 1980, part 153 of 19 C.F.R. was deleted, and the antidumping regulations were
codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 353. This change was made to conform with the transfer of
responsibility for antidumping investigations from the Customs Service to the ITA. See supra
note 11. The only change in the SCE provision, 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1980), was the codification of the previously unstated preference for comparisons based on prices in § 353.8(a). 45
Fed. Reg. 8,182, 8,184 (1980).
96. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.8(a)(1),(2),(b)(1) (1980).
97. Id. at § 353.8(b)(1). See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
98. 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(b)(2) (1980). These values are to be considered if no country can
be identified under § 353.8(b)(1).
99. Id. at § 353.8(c).
100. Id.
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satisfaction of the Secretary (of the administering authority).1 1
Finally, such components or factors are valued and then verified in
a non-state-controlled economy country determined to be reasonably comparable in economic development to the SCE country
being investigated.10 2 As a last resort, United States price or con03
structed value of such or similar merchandise may be considered.
These amendments to the Treasury regulations were made
under the authority of the Trade Act of 1974.104 While there was
some question as to their validity under the Trade Act, 0 5 Congress
has most recently re-enacted the provision of the Trade Act dealing
with merchandise from SCE countries.10 6 However, the reenactment was made with the specific caveat that it was
not intended as a general expression of approval or disapproval
of current regulations or administrative practice. This should be
emphasized with respect to regulations regarding the0 7 current
law on dumping from nonmarket economy countries.
Thus, the status of the current regulatory scheme is unclear,
especially in light of current legislative proposals, discussed below.
II. THE RECENT CASES: MOUNTING
DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SCE PROVISIONS
The difficulties encountered by Treasury in the Polish Golf
Car case have not abated since responsibility for administering
United States antidumping law was transferred from Treasury to
Commerce. 0 8 In three recent cases, respondents from the People's
Republic of China, 09 the German Democratic Republic" and the

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at § 353.8(b)(3).
104. Trade Act, supra note 1. See 19 C.F.R. pt. 153 (1979).
105. See Dumping from 'ControlledEconomy' Countries, supra note 84, at 790-93.
106. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-77 (Supp. III 1979).
107. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 96, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 482.
108. See supra note 11.
109. See Natural Menthol from The People's Republic of China, 46 Fed. Reg. 3,258
(1981) (preliminary LTFV determination), 46 Fed. Reg. 24,614 (1981) (final LTFV determination). The authors of this Article participated in the menthol antidumping investigation.
110. See Unrefined Montan Wax from the German Democratic Republic, 46 Fed. Reg.
38,555 (1981) (final LTFV determination).
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Hungarian People's Republic"' have vigorously challenged both
the applicability and the means of implementation of the SCE
provisions in their cases.
Such challenges reflect the inequity and uncertainty that socialist and communist countries have concededly encountered in
SCE cases. At a recent congressional hearing on proposed legislation to amend the SCE provisions, Lionel Olmer, Undersecretary of
Commerce for International Trade, testified that the current statute and regulations are burdensome, complicated and costly to
administer.1 2 He added that the results of investigations of nonmarket economies may be "highly unpredictable, difficult to calculate, and based on commercial behavior of a [surrogate] producer
not involved in the alleged unfair trade practice." 113 Mr. Olmer's
candor may well have reflected Commerce's extraordinarily difficult recent experience in the Menthol, Montan Wax and Truck
TrailerAxle cases. The theory that a comparable economy can be
found to substitute for a purported SCE is at best a very crude
concept. In reality, there is no "free-market" economy that is reasonably comparable to the economy of China or East Germany, for
example. If such a surrogate really exists, its economy would not
normally be free-market in structure. Potential surrogates that are
comparable in an overall macroeconomic sense are generally mixed
or socialist economies with considerable government interventionperhaps even more than the putative SCE.
While the Antidumping Act purportedly does not infringe on
the comparative advantage of greater efficiency or lower production costs that might be enjoyed by exporting countries, an SCE
determination often ensures that production advantages in socialist
and communist countries will be secondary to an often artificial
price determined on the basis of home market or export prices or
constructed values of producers in another country. Furthermore,
once an SCE finding is made (assuming an affirmative dumping
determination follows), the exporter from the "controlled" economy country in effect relinquishes control over its pricing decisions
for exports to the United States, since prices or costs of a third
country producer or exporter will have become the determinant of
111. See Truck Trailer Axle-and-Brake Assemblies from the Hungarian People's Republic, 46 Fed. Reg. 46,152 (1981) (preliminary LTFV determination).
112. U.S. IMPORT WEELY (BNA) 410-11 (Feb. 3, 1982).
113. Id. at 411.
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the SCE exporter's prices. Marketing under such circumstances is
difficult, and United States importers are unwilling to assume the
risk of significant antidumping duties.
A. Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of China
The case of Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of
China" 4 was the first antidumping case involving exports from the
People's Republic of China (China). Confronting both the affirmative SCE determination in the Polish Golf Car case and the widespread perception in the United States of a high degree of central
planning and state control in China, the China National Native
Produce and Animal By-Products Import & Export Corporation
(CNEC), the Chinese menthol exporter, sought both to alter that
perception and to distinguish its case from the Polish Golf, Car
case.1 5 In its filings with the Commerce Department, CNEC
asserted that (i) the production and sale of menthol in China is
essentially free from state control, (ii) the perception of the Chinese
economy as totally dominated by the central government is inaccurate, particularly in light of recent changes, and (iii) the agricultural sector, comprising approximately eighty percent of China's
economy, is subject to limited state influence with no significant
state intervention in the production and pricing of nonessential
products, including menthol." 6 While CNEC argued that the
overall role of the government in China's economy has been overstated by commentators, CNEC emphasized the almost complete
lack of government intervention in the nonessential agricultural
7
goods sector of the Chinese economy."
In its filings in opposition to CNEC's papers, the United States
petitioner, Haarmann & Reimer Corp., emphasized the evidence of
general intervention of the Chinese government in the nation's
economy, pointing to China's reliance on state and regional plan-

114. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,258 (1981) (preliminary LTFV determination), 46 Fed. Reg.
24,614 (1981) (final LTFV determination).
115. See Statements, Affidavits and Memoranda filed by CNEC with Department of
Commerce (Oct. 16, 1980 and Nov. 25, 1980) [hereinafter cited as CNEC papers] (copies on
file at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal office).
116. Id.
117. See the Memorandum and Affidavit submitted on behalf of CNEC to the International Trade Administration, Oct. 16, 1980.
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ning in industry and in essential agricultural goods." 8 Haarmann
& Reimer argued that the changes in the Chinese economy were
limited, and that the general characterization of the economy as
state-controlled remained correct."'
CNEC's and Haarmann & Reimer's arguments highlighted an
issue that remains unresolved under the current SCE statute and
regulations. Under the SCE statute Commerce shall make an SCE
determination
[i]f available information indicates to the administering
authority that the economy of the country from which the merchandise is exported is State-controlled to an extent that sales or
offers of sales of such or similar merchandise in that country or
to countries other than the United States do not permit a determination of foreign market value .... 110
0

This provision indicates that the SCE determination rests upon an
evaluation of the extent of state influence in order to determine its
impact on prices of the merchandise in question in the exporting
country's home market or non-United States export markets. It
invites extensive argumentation and sophisticated economic analysis of a country's economic structure and makeup. In the Menthol
case, Commerce was confronted by a question not clearly resolved
by the statute: should the SCE issue be determined by examining
the impact of state influence on the particular sector of the exporting country's economy in which the merchandise is produced and
sold, or should Commerce make a more general determination of
state control in the economy as a whole.
In its preliminary LTFV determination (which was incorporated, as to the SCE issue, in the final LTFV determination),
Commerce recognized the issue of the sectoral versus the general
economy approach but did not decide it:
A threshold question is raised by respondent's [CNEC's]
contention that the special rules of section 773(c) apply only if
118. Letter from Eugene L. Stewart (special counsel to Haarmann & Reimer Corp.) to
Mary S. Clapp, Supervisory Import Administration Specialist, Department of Commerce
(Nov. 17, 1980).
119. Letter from Eugene L. Stewart (special counsel to petitioner Haarmann & Reimer
Corp.) to Mary S. Clapp, Supervisory Import Administration Specialist, Department of
Commerce (Nov. 1, 1980).
120. 19 U.S.C. § 1676(c) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
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the effects of state economic controls on the particularsector in
question are such that a fair value determination under normal
procedures cannot be made. Respondent finds support for its
position in the language of the statute, which is drafted in terms
of whether an exporting country being state-controlled "to an
extent that sales or offers of sales of such or similar merchandise"
(emphasis added) do not permit normal foreign market value
calculations. Respondent also finds support for its position in a
number of antidumping determinations by the Treasury Department in the 1960's.
Counsel for petitioner contends that the statutory language
quoted above, when read in light of its legislative history, requires the administering authority to apply the special provisions
of section 773(c) whenever a determination is made that the
economy of a country is generally state controlled. Under this
interpretation, sectoral analysis of the impact of state controls is
unnecessary.
In reaching our conclusion in this preliminary determination, we have examined (and discuss below) both the degree of
control exercised by the State over the PRC economy generally
and the impact of state control on the production and sale of
menthol. Since our conclusion would be the same under either
petitioner's or respondent's interpretation of the statute, we need
not specifically decide the issue at this time. We do, however,
note that in our view, respondent has raised arguments which
would have to be given very careful consideration where different conclusions would have resulted depending upon the ap12
proach taken. 1
Commerce decided that while "the [Chinese] government has
considerable control over the composition of inputs and the distribution of outputs . . . natural menthol is subject to very little direct
regulation . . . [T]he purchases and sales of menthol in the PRC
essentially are based on market considerations."' 1 2 However, it
also decided (i) that the primary components in the production of
menthol-land and labor-were not bought and sold in a genuine
market and (ii) that the "pervasiveness of state planning and condistorts the incentives that
trol of major agricultural products .

121. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,259 (1981).
122. Id.
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would be developed by a freely operating market."' 123 On that
12 4
basis, Commerce made an affirmative SCE determination.
Commerce then proceeded to address the second part of the
SCE issue: the choice of an alternative, or "surrogate," for China's
home market prices for menthol. CNEC suggested that, since menthol is bought and sold through an international market based in
London, such a free market would furnish a reliable indicator of
foreign market value and is authorized under the statute 25 and
126
prior cases utilizing sales of the merchandise to other countries.
Haarmann & Reimer proposed that Commerce use Brazilian home
market prices for menthol as the basis for the fair value determination. Commerce adopted neither suggestion, and instead selected
Paraguay as the menthol-producing country whose economy most
nearly approximated that of China. However, since Paraguay was
found to have no home market for menthol, Commerce used prices
2 7
in Paraguay's principal export market, the United States.
The convoluted SCE inquiry in the Menthol case left Commerce relying on one or two telephone inquiries to a United States
importer of Paraguayan menthol to determine the foreign market
value, with no time even to consider adjustments at the preliminary
stage. This resulted in a 13.5 percent preliminary LTFV marginmore than five times the margin finally determined.
As in the Polish Golf Car case, the final SCE determination in
the Menthol case entailed consideration of a variety of adjustments
to Paraguay's prices in order to arrive at an equitable comparison of
ex-factory Chinese and Paraguayan prices. While Commerce made
several of the proposed adjustments, it was not able, for lack of time
and data, to make proposed adjustments for differences in Chinese
and Paraguayan contract periods and in the volume of menthol sold
under individual contracts. 28 As a result, an LTFV margin of 2.5
percent was found by Commerce in its final determination. Ulti-

123. Id.
124. Id. at 3,260 (1981). Ultimately, the ITC determined that there was no material
injury, threat thereof or material retardation of an industry in the United States, and
antidumping duties were not assessed. 46 Fed. Reg. 31,796 (1981).
125. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1), which authorizes the use of "the prices . . . at which such
or similar merchandise of a non-state-controlled-economy country . . . is sold . . . to other
countries, including the United States ....
126. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
127. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,260 (1981).
128. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,615 (1981).
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mately, however, no dumping was found because the International
of injury
Trade Commission found that no material injury or threat
29
imports.
menthol
Chinese
of
reason
had occurred by
Throughout the Menthol case CNEC urged Commerce to embody a measure of comparative economic analysis in its SCE determination. CNEC emphasized the irony and inequity that would
result if Commerce selected a surrogate country whose production
and sale of the merchandise under consideration involved greater
state influence (at least in the sector under consideration) than that
of China. 30 Commerce's rejection of several potential surrogates,
such as South Korea and Brazil, may have been influenced by this
consideration. However, Paraguay also had state controls, including taxes, minimum export prices set by the central bank, and a
dual exchange rate system, that did not exist in China.13 1 While
Commerce ultimately made an adjustment for Paraguay's export
insured greater
tax, it ignored other adjustments that would have
32
comparability between Paraguay and China.
B. Unrefined Montan Wax from the
German Democratic Republic
Commerce's inquiry in the case of Unrefined Montan Wax
from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) did not
focus, as it had in the Menthol case, upon the determination of
whether the foreign market value in the home country could be
determined. With little dispute from the parties, Commerce found
that the economy of East Germany is state controlled such that East
German home market or export prices could not be utilized. The
key issues in the Montan Wax case were (i) the method of valuation, (ii) the choice of a surrogate country, and (iii) the nature and
amounts of adjustments to the surrogate country values.
At the outset, Commerce confronted the issue of whether to
use surrogate country prices or constructed value as the measure of
foreign market value:
[W]e are required by section 773(c) of the Act [19 U.S.C. § 1673
b(c)] to use the prices, or the constructed value, of such or
129. 46 Fed. Reg. 31,796 (1981).
130. See, e.g., CNEC papers, supra note 115, Memorandum of Oct. 16, 1980, at 20-53
and Reply Memorandum of Nov. 25, 1980, at 27-34.
131. See CNEC papers, supra note 115, Memorandum of Oct. 16, 1980, at 51-53.
132. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,615 (1981).
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similar merchandise in a non-state-controlled country or countries. Our regulations establish a clear preference for a foreign
market value based upon sales prices and stipulate that, to the
extent possible, sales prices or constructed value should be determined on the basis of prices or costs in a non-state-controlled133
economy country ....
However, the "clear preference for a foreign market value based
upon sales prices" proved unavailing in the Montan Wax case.
Apart from a West German producer that refused to provide data,
there was no commercial production of unrefined montan wax or
similar merchandise in a non-SCE other than the United States.
134
Therefore, Commerce had to use a constructed value.
The next question was the selection of a surrogate country.
The Commerce Department indicated early in the case that it
favored the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) as the
surrogate for East Germany. Counsel for the importer of montan
wax from East Germany argued that such a choice was unfair,
primarily because the primary cost inputs of montan wax-labor
and lignite-were much higher in West Germany. 135 Statistics
collected by Commerce's economists showed that per capita annual
gross national product in West Germany was $8160, as opposed to
$4680 in East Germany. 13
The importer observed that the relevant labor costs in montan
wax production were equally disparate and argued that the much
higher West German labor costs would yield an unfairly high constructed value for montan wax and, in effect, construct a dumping
margin that did not actually exist. 137 The importer proposed that

133. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,555 (1981).
134. Id. The refusal to provide data by surrogate country producers can be a difficult
problem for Commerce. Surrogate country producers are often competitors of both the
United States petitioner and the respondent in antidumping investigations. Quite apart from
the normal desire to keep business information confidential, competitive considerations may
play a role in determining the willingness to cooperate.
135. See, e.g., Letters from Chapman, Duff and Paul (counsel to Strohmeyer & Arpe,
the United States importer) to John Greenwald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import
Administration (Jan. 6 and Feb. 12, 22, 24 and 26, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Chapman,
Duff and Paul Letters].
136. Memorandum from Michael K. Levine, Office of the Chief Economist, Import
Administration, to Shannon Shuman, Office of Policy, Import Administration (Oct. 14,
1980) [hereinafter cited as Levine Memorandum].
137. Chapman, Duff and Paul Letter (Feb. 22, 1981), supra note 134.
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the United Kingdom be used as surrogate (possibly in combination
with Canada), since the United Kingdom's annual per capita GNP
closely approximated that of East Germany, and its other production cost factors were also closer to East German costs than those of
38
West Germany.1
The importer also attempted to distinguish the Montan Wax
case from the Menthol case, in which the surrogate selected by
Commerce-Paraguay-had much higher GNP and labor costs
than China. The importer observed that it was unimportant in
Menthol from China to compare Paraguayan and Chinese cost
components, since Commerce was able to compare the two countries' prices in foreign markets in reaching its LTFV determination.
The importer argued that Paraguayan prices in foreign markets
were not determined by production costs, but were the result of
market factors. However, the importer argued that because in
Montan Wax Commerce was specifically using production costs in
its constructed value exercise, large variances in surrogate and exporting country production costs would completely skew the for39
eign market value determination.
Without analysis, Commerce rejected the importer's contentions, stating in conclusory fashion that "we found that, of the
industrialized countries, the FRG is more comparable to the GDR
for purposes of this case than is the UK or Canada." 140 Commerce
made its choice a double blow to the respondents when it also
refused to make any adjustments for differences in East and West
German GNP and labor costs, or for any other reason, stating that
"once a reasonably comparable surrogate is chosen, then no adjustments are to be made under section 353.8(c) of the Commerce
Regulations.' 14' The result was an assessment of a 13.02 percent
42
dumping duty against the East German exporter.
The determination in Montan Wax highlights the inequities of
the current SCE statute and regulations, as well as the potential
arbitrariness of Commerce determinations thereunder. Any production cost advantages enjoyed by the East German producer
were obliterated in favor of the much higher costs of a more pros-

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Chapman, Duff and Paul Letter (Feb. 12, 1981), supra note 134.
Chapman, Duff and Paul Letter (Feb. 26, 1981), supra note 134.
46 Fed. Reg. 38,556 (1981).
Id. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(c) (1980).
46 Fed. Reg. 43,727 (1981) (amended final determination).
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perous neighbor. Uncontroverted evidence of the disparities in East

and West German production costs, documented extensively by the
importer, were disregarded without explanation in Commerce's
final determination. Commerce's memoranda suggest that the
physical, cultural and historic proximity of East and West Germany
3
were considered as much as the economic factors.14
C. Truck Trailer Axles From Hungary

In Truck TrailerAxle-and-Brake Assemblies from the Hungarian People's Republic,144 Commerce continued to adhere to the
modes of analysis and conclusions it had followed in Menthol from
China. Indeed, the Truck Trailer Axle case closely paralleled the
Menthol case in terms of the nature and difficulty of the issues
raised and the positions taken by the parties.
The producer of the merchandise, Hungarian Railway Carriage and Machine Works (RABA), furnished substantial evidence
of the gradual reform and decentralization of Hungary's economy
in the past decade.1 45 RABA, like CNEC in the Menthol case,
suggested a sectoral approach to the SCE issue, noting that intermediate industries like truck trailer axle producers operated in the least
controlled sector of Hungary's economy; but RABA also argued that
46
Hungary's economy was generally not state controlled. 1

143. Levine Memorandum, supra note 136, at 2. Commerce's initial inclination toward
West Germany may have reflected the fact that West Germany, like East Germany, is a large
producer of lignite, the principal raw material in montan wax production, id. at 4, while the
United Kingdom produces very little lignite. See Chapman, Duff and Paul Letter, February
22, 1981, supra note 135, at 12. Further, a West German producer of refined montan wax,
Hoechst, was potentially available to supply actual lignite production cost figures. The
United States importers furnished data showing the West German lignite production was
much more difficult and costly than East German production, id., and they suggested that
lignite production costs in Canada be used together with the other cost components from the
United Kingdom. Chapman, Duff and Paul Letter, February 26, 1981, supra note 135. In
any event, any potential advantage resulting from use of actual West German lignite production cost figures was lost when Hoechst refused to provide the data. Commerce's final LTFV
determination made no reference to West German lignite production costs. 46 Fed. Reg.
38,556 (1981).
144. 46 Fed. Reg. 46,152 (1981).
145. See Further Submission of Hungarian Railroad Carriage and Machine Works
(RABA) in Support of the Use of Hungarian Values for Determining Foreign Market Value,
submitted by Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Counsel for RABA, to Commerce, May 12,
1981.
146. Id.
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Commerce's own economists made an initial recommendation
for the use of Hungary's home market prices, finding that reforms
in Hungary had progressed sufficiently to warrant serious consideration of a non-SCE designation. 147 However, petitioner Rockwell
International Corporation argued vehemently that Hungary's economy remained state-controlled, and Commerce concluded in its
preliminary determination that Hungary's economy was state-controlled for purposes of the investigation. 148 The factors upon which
the determination was based included (i) government controls on
wage increases by means of prohibitive tax rates (which had themselves been subject to recent reform), (ii) state control over capital
financing through taxation and control over banking, (iii) restrictions on imports through licensing and currency controls, (iv) the
government's power of appointment of industrial management,
the degree of implementation of
and (v) uncertainty concerning
9
reforms.14
the more recent
RABA's counsel requested an explanation of the process used
by Commerce in determining that Hungary had an SCE for purposes of the trailer axles cases. The unspecific and conclusory response is indicative of Commerce's practices and demonstrates the
lack of predictability in dealing with SCE determinations:
[T]here is no single decisive factor in such a determination.
There are many factors which may be relevant ... and they
will vary depending on the economy and product involved.
Each case involving the issue of state control is unique, and
therefore independent of decisions made in other cases.
In the case of Hungarian trailer axles, the Department
considered information obtained from many sources, such as the
Department's economists, other experts on the Hungarian economy throughout the government and in the academic sphere,
and persons from private organizations such as the attorneys for
both the petitioner and the respondents. The Department's research was thorough.
There were numerous factors that were important in the
determination that Hungary, in the axles case, is state-controlled

147. Draft Memorandum from Richard Boyce, Office of Policy and Compliance, to
John Greenwald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration (Apr. 1, 1981).
148. 46 Fed. Reg. 46,152 (1981).
149. Id. at 46,152-53.
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including the inconvertability of the forint and the ceiling on
average wage increases. These are not the only factors. I must
more than any other
emphasize to you that no factor was valued
50
in the determination of state control.1
Commerce's SCE finding was decisive in the Truck Trailer
Axle case: Italy was selected as a surrogate, and, after a brief
inquiry of the Italian trailer axle producer, Commerce reached an
"estimated" preliminary LTFV margin of 68.1 percent.'15 Ironically, Commerce conceded that it had only a limited opportunity to
calculate and verify this prohibitive margin because of "gaps" in
data received from the Italian producer., 2 Unverified adjustments
were made, under those constraints, only for obvious product differences, but Commerce promised to correct such deficiencies-or
even select an entirely different surrogate-at the time of the final
determination. Moreover, no final determination was ever reached,
since RABA entered into an agreement for the suspension of the
investigation after the preliminary determination 5 3 was published.
Commerce's preliminary determination in the Truck Trailer
Axle case emphasized that a different finding could be made on the
SCE issue in future cases.' 5 4 In a separate letter to RABA's counsel
announcing the SCE determination, Commerce was almost apologetic for the uncertainty generated by the current statute: "As you
know, the Congress is at present considering changes in this area of
the trade laws, and perhaps there will be more definite statutory
guidance in the future."l15
Adding to the unpredictable situation where surrogates are
involved, surrogate country currency fluctuations can radically
change the LTFV comparison and increase, reduce or even eliminate the purported LTFV sales. Indeed, significant reductions of
LTFV margins in the East German Montan Wax and Hungarian
Truck Trailer Axle matters were experienced following the LTFV
determinations in those cases. These currency fluctuations relative

150. Letter from Lawrence J. Brady, Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration, to
Arthur T. Downey, counsel for RABA (July 31, 1981).
151. 46 Fed. Reg. at 46,153-54 (1981).
152. Id. at 46,153.
153. 47 Fed. Reg. 66 (1982).
154. Id.
155. Letter from Lawrence J. Brady, Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, to
Arthur T. Downey, (counsel for RABA) (June 19, 1981).
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to the United States dollar may reflect little on the relative values in
the surrogate country and in the United States of the particular
product under investigation.
What emerges from the Menthol, Montan Wax, and Truck
TrailerAxle determinations is a picture of an administering authority uncomfortable with the obvious absurdities and rigidities imposed by the governing statute and compelled to apply that statute
under strict time constraints to increasingly complex economic realities. The results are (i) a series of SCE determinations reflecting
limited economic analysis, and (ii) a series of hasty LTFV margin
determinations that are both inequitable to the exporters and unfathomable to petitioning United States parties, thereby reducing
desirable emphasis on rationality and predictability in United
States antidumping law administration.
III. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO RECTIFY
THE SCE DETERMINATION PROBLEMS
Senate bill 958,156 commonly known as the Heinz bill, currently before Congress, would amend the SCE provisions. The
present SCE statute is triggered by allegations of a petitioning
United States party that the economy of the exporting country is
state-controlled to the extent that a determination of foreign market
value cannot be made. 5 7 Ambiguities inherent in this approach
have been noted above. 158 The Heinz bill approaches the problem
somewhat differently:
The term nonmarket economy country means any country
the economy of which, as determined by the administering authority, operates on principles other than those of a free market
to an extent that sales or offers of sale of merchandise in that
country or to countries other than the 59United States do not
reflect the fair value of the merchandise.1
Remarks accompanying the introduction of the Heinz bill
noted that the present law interprets nonmarket economy narrowly
in applying the SCE provisions only to communist countries, and
that "[a]s the international economy grows in sophistication and

156.
157.
158.
159.

See supra note 9.
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (Supp. III 1979).
See supra section II.
127 CONG. REc. S3784 (daily ed. April 9, 1981).
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complexity, a number of the socialist countries are becoming mixed
national economies, and the prior definition which put everything
in the context of communism becomes simplistic." 160 This statement is not correct because the prior definition did not "put everything in the context of communism"-communism has never been
explicitly stated as the basis for an SCE determination. In any
event, S. 958 attempts to approach the problem from the standpoint of economic theory, under which the administering authority
would be making an economic judgment about the country's market system rather than a political judgment about the country's
government. 16 1 Admittedly, this approach would not necessarily
make the practical difficulties any easier, but it would be faithful to
62
the principle the new legislation is trying to establish.1
The bill does, however, provide for the possible use of home
market prices even though a nonmarket economy country is involved. If such a country furnishes verifiable information, it may be
treated as a free market economy country for the purposes of the
antidumping investigation. 16 3 Thus, the new provision would explicitly favor a sectoral approach to determining state control (or
the presence of a nonmarket economy) over a more general, "communist country" approach, at least where the administering authority would be able to verify the relevant data.
One of the more distasteful aspects of antidumping investigations from the perspective of foreign producers is the role of the
United States government as arbiter of dumping complaints. This is
particularly true where there is some degree of state involvement in
enterprises and the United States government seeks to verify data it
requests in antidumping investigations. Sovereigns may be uncomfortable with the notion of inspectors from the United States gov-

160. Id. at S3783. The quoted language appears to refer to Title IV, § 406 of the Trade
Act, supra note 1, at 2062-63, which is not part of the antidumping statute and which deals
with market disruption from communist countries. S. 958 amends § 406, as well as the
antidumping law, which probably explains the confusing reference to a definition that puts
"everything in the context of communism."
161. Id.
162. Id. "In short, we have tried to create with this legislation a carrot and stick
mechanism that will encourage nonmarket economies to cooperate with our Government in
investigating the allegations in petitions filed against them and to adjust their economies in a
way that will permit such cooperation to take place." Id. The theory that the administration
of the United States antidumping law can encourage a move to market-type economic
systems is unsupported and seems unlikely.
163. Id. at S3784.
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ernment visiting production facilities in their countries and asking
for extensive data on costs and pricing. As a practical matter, the
"carrot and stick" approach of the Heinz bill to encourage nonmarket economies to adjust their economies to permit use of home
market prices may not be effective. It is doubtful that sovereigns
will alter their economic systems in order to use home market prices
in United States antidumping investigations. Ironically, the existence of some state control can facilitate verification. The determination to cooperate can be direct and swift and the supply of data
can be uncomplicated compared to verification in "free-market
economies." Cultural differences, not economic structure, may be
the determinative factor. Acceptable and flexible verification practices will have to be employed.
Where no verifiable data is available, the Heinz bill would do
away with the alternative measures currently available 6 4 for determining foreign market value and use only the "lowest free-market
price." Lowest free-market price is defined as:
the lowest average price, adjusted for differences in quantity,
level of trade, duties or other factors required to insure comparability, charged for like articles in this country by any producer or
aggregate of producers from an appropriate free-market country, including the United States, which . . . produces a sufficient quantity of like articles for the administering authority to
determine a representative price. 1 5
This method has considerable advantages. It would eliminate
the current "comparable economy country" approach, which assumes that a "simple and accurate basis exists for determining when
economies are at comparable stages of development and that comparable overall levels of development- assuming such can be determined-mean comparable levels within a particular industry.", 6
The Comptroller General's comments on this approach 6 7 are particularly revealing:
The administrative advantage of this approach is that it
eliminates the need to analyze other market economies and their
164. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
165. 127 CONG. REC. S3784 (daily ed. April 9, 1981).
166. Id. at S3782.
167. The Comptroller General's Report, supra note 2, at 20-22, recommends this same
approach, coupled with a simulated constructed value which would always be available as
an alternative. See infra notes 178-183 and accompanying text.

310

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:277

producers for suitability as surrogates as well as the need to gain
their cooperation. The administering authority also is freed from
the need to make what are often very subjective adjustments to a
surrogate producer's selling prices for differences in production
technology and scale.
In addition, this approach would give both nonmarket
economy exporters and prospective U.S. petitioners a significantly clearer idea of what the foreign market value of a given
product is likely to be (to the extent they can gauge the lowest
weighted average price in the U.S. market). This contrasts with
current simulation methods, where it is not possible to predict
which producer's prices would be used or what adjustment
made. 18
However, the Comptroller General's Report goes on to suggest
an unfairness that is inherent in the proposal: "A weakness of this
approach is that it presumes that nonmarket producers are never
".160 In addition,
the most efficient producers of a product ....
such an approach would re-introduce the problem encountered in
the Polish Golf Car case of possible preclusion from the United
States market, 7 at least where the United States and a nonmarket
economy country were the only two countries producing the relevant merchandise in sufficient quantities.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL
The Comptroller General of the United States has recently
criticized the SCE provisions and Commerce procedure.17 1 Building on the current statutes, the Comptroller General recommends
that Commerce should "develop and publish criteria to be used in
determining whether a nonmarket economy producer's actual
172
prices or costs could be used in a dumping case."

168. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
169. id.
170. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.

171. See

COMMOLLE

GENERAL'S RFPORT,

supra note 2.

172. Id. at ii. See also id. at 16-20. The Comptroller General's Report goes on to suggest
what these criteria might be:
The criteria to be included would reasonably focus on economic factors related
to the country, sector, and enterprise. National economy factors might include a
domestic price system which reflects supply and demand and the existence of a

1982]

ROADBLOCK TO TRADE

The Comptroller General goes further and explicitly recommends the use of home market prices, where possible, to avoid
problems associated with surrogate selection and use.' 73 If Commerce decides that a surrogate must be used, the Comptroller
General recommends that Commerce "set out the criteria to be used
in selecting surrogate producer(s) and publish the reasons for specific selections in individual dumping cases." 174 The Comptroller
75
General believes that Commerce's selection process is reasonable,'
but that amending the regulations to indicate the types of factors
that are considered would afford parties a better basis for arguing
which surrogate is the most appropriate.' 7 Similarly, publishing
decision memoranda in individual cases that state the bases for
surrogate selections would improve prospective parties' understand-

single market exchange rate for the domestic currency or the ability to approximate
such a rate.
Sectoral and enterprise factors might include:
a high degree of decentralized decisionmaking with enterprise control over
production levels, product mix, marketing, and pricing.
Enterprise goals expressed in terms of earnings, not physical output units.
Valuation of inputs in accordance with world prices.
Documented and verifiable records of sales.
Books and records in verifiable, acceptable format.
Physical input units/costs and major indirect costs that can be verified as
they are in the United States.
Capitalization in a convertible currency.
Acquisition of significant percentages of plant and/or real estate assets
under market conditions.
Id. at 19-20.
173. Id. at 16-19.
174. Id. at ii.
175. Commerce regulations state that the selection of a comparable surrogate economy
is to be based on "generally recognized criteria, including per capita gross national product
and infrastructure development (particularly in the industry producing such or similar
merchandise)." 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(b)(1) (1980). See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
However, the Comptroller General's Report, supra note 2, asserts that "Commerce's case
analysts actually use a blend of macroeconomic and enterprise factors when selecting the
surrogate country or producer. Commerce officials believe that doing this better enables
them to identify the surrogate whose prices and costs require the fewest adjustments."
COMMrROLLMI GENr'MAL's REPoRT, supra note 2, at 24.
176. Id.
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ing of the selection process and improve the quality of petitions and
responses. 177
The Comptroller General also recommends amending the SCE
provisions. Specifically, the Comptroller General's Report suggests
that fair value for merchandise from nonmarket economy countries
be determined by either the price being charged by the lowest price
market producer selling in the United States or a constructed value
based on valuing actual factors of production at appropriate market
economy prices. 178 It should be observed that the first value is
similar to that suggested by the legislation currently before Congress, 17 and the alternative value is the measure of constructed
value currently provided for in the Commerce regulations. 180 After
explaining the advantages of the "lowest free market producer"
test, 8" the Comptroller General goes on to note that "[a] weakness
of this approach is that it presumes that nonmarket producers are
never the most efficient producers of a product."182 In an effort to
offset this weakness, the Comptroller General suggests that the
183
constructed value method should always be an option.
The problem with this approach is the difficulty of accurately
measuring efficiency to determine if, in fact, the nonmarket producer is the most efficient. Assuming that the problem can be solved
and a constructed value method is employed, Commerce will then
have to struggle with the process of determining a fair constructed

177. Id.
178. Id. at ii.
179. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text, where use of this value with no
alternative is suggested by S. 958.
180. 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1980).
181. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
182. COMPrROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
183. Id. at 22. Although it notes the difficulties involved in using a simulated constructed value, the Comptroller General's Report goes on to enumerate the advantages of
such an approach:
It is a fair way to permit a nonmarket economy producer to attempt to show it has
economic efficiencies.
It permits the use of production factors within some control of the actual producer.
It provides costs that can be valued in U.S. dollars.
It reduces the administrative problems associated with gaining the cooperation of
surrogate producers and making the necessary adjustments for differences in production techniques and scales.
id. at 23.
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value. A constructed value determination is basically unstructured
and its outcome is extremely difficult to predict. Due to the lack of
clear parameters in determining a fair constructed value, abuse of
discretion is a concern. In any event, participants in the evaluation
may be frustrated by the lack of predictability, the cost and the
possible appearance of arbitrariness.
V. EEC AND GATT PROVISIONS FOR SCEs
The European Economic Community (EEC) provisions dealing with dumping from nonmarket economy countries (called
"State-trading countries") are both similar to and different from the
United States provisions. The most striking difference is the simplicity of the initial decision of whether a country is an SCE. As
discussed above, in the United States there is considerable debate
over how this determination should be made and whether a sectoral
or more general overall economy or a "communist country" approach should be used. The EEC takes a straightforward approach,
and has simply incorporated a list into its regulations of what it
considers to be State-trading countries.1 8 4 Short of changing the
regulation, there would appear to be no flexibility with regard to
the correctness of an SCE designation at the outset of an investigation.
The EEC provision is similar to the United States provision in
the price alternatives available for determining foreign market
value (called "normal value" in the EEC regulations) once a country has been designated as having a nonmarket economy. The
choices set out in the EEC regulations are third (market economy)
country prices (either in the home market or export prices to other
countries) or the constructed value in a market economy third
country. 185 If neither third country price nor constructed value
provides an adequate basis for comparison, the price actually paid
184. Council Regulation of Dec. 20, 1979, No. 3017/79, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
339) 1, 3 (1979), reprinted in C. STANBROOK, DUMPING 105, 107 (1980), incorporating
Council Regulation of Oct. 31, 1978, No. 2532/78, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 306) 1 (1978)
and Council Regulation of May 29, 1979, No. 925/79, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 131) 1
(1979). The list includes the People's Republic of China, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, U.S.S.R., Albania, Vietnam, North
Korea, and Mongolia. Regulation No. 3017/79 states that the special provisions regarding
dumping from State-trading countries apply in particular to these countries, but leaves open
the possibility that there might be other nonmarket economy countries. Council Regulation
No. 3017/79, art. 2(5).
185. Id.
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or payable in the Community, including a reasonable profit margin, may be used.188 Further, if third country prices are used, the
third country selected must normally be a country at a stage of
87
development comparable to that of the State-trading country. 1
EEC questionnaires issued in connection with investigating
complaints request information for 12 months preceding the initiation of the antidumping investigation.' 88 Information as to home
market price in a market economy third country is supplied by the
party lodging the dumping complaint,1 89 while price information
for sales to third countries is supplied by the producer and/or
exporter of the merchandise under investigation,19 0 as is information regarding the cost of production in the exporting country.' 9'
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has no
explicit provision dealing with SCEs. Normally, dumping occurs
when the price of the product exported from one country to another
"is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade,
for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting
country."19 2 However, if sales within an SCE are interpreted as
not occurring "in the ordinary course of trade," 9 3 there will be no
meaningful home market price and resort may be made to either
the highest export price to any third country or the cost of production in the country of origin (plus a reasonable addition for selling
cost and profit.) 914 The GATT provisions do not reflect a sophisticated analysis or the evolution of provisions from particular cases.

186. Id.
187. EEC Questionnaire for lodging complaints, question 2, n.4, reprinted in C.
BROOK,

STAN-

supra note 184, at 89.

188. EEC Questionnaire intended for producers and exporters of products which are
the subject of an antidumping anti-subsidies complaint and EEC Questionnaire for importers
of products which are the subject of an antidumping complaint, reprinted in C. STANBROOK,
supra note 184, at 95-104 (emphasis in original).
189. EEC Questionnaire for lodging complaints, reprintedin C. STANBROOK, supra note
184, at 89.
190. See supra note 188.

191. See C.

STANBROOK,

supra note 184, at 100.

192. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signatureOct. 30, 1947, art.
VI, § 1(a), 61 Stat. A3, A23, T.I.A.S. N. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
193. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text; the issue presented is whether
transactions within an SCE occur "in the ordinary course of trade," and the importance of
the question to United States antidumping law.

194. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 192, art. VI, § 1(b). See
Agreement on Implementation of article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
supra note 74, art. 2(d), reprintedin C. STANBROOK, supra note 184, at 139. With regard to
article VI of the GATT, the International Antidumping Code, and implementation of the
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The expansion of United States trade with communist and
socialist countries, 195 coupled with the increasing role of market
influences in such countries' economies, 9" have made the current
SCE provisions of the Antidumping Act unworkable, inequitable
and obsolete. Congressional reexamination of the SCE provisions is
thus essential. The Heinz bill 1 7 is a- step in the right direction.
While it will have little impact on Commerce's current practice in
determining whether a particular economy is state controlled, it
should at least simplify the foreign market value calculation once
19 8
an SCE determination has been made.
However, the criticism of the proposed revisions also has
merit. It is unclear, for example, why the willingness of an SCE
producer to furnish data to the United States authorities should
determine the use or non-use of its prices in making the foreign
market value determination. The theory that such prices may not
reflect real market value and should not be used would be ignored.
If the home market price is artificially high, United States petitioners will fight for its use-if artificially low, the foreign producer
will want to use the home market price. Similarly, the "lowest freemarket price" alternative virtually guarantees, as critics of the
proposal suggest, 99 that the exporter from an SCE country will not
be permitted to sell its products in the United States at prices below
those of all other producers, even if the SCE producer is more
efficient than its competitors.
Congress should thus consider a more complete revision of the
SCE provisions, to include the following:
1. A real revision of the factors involved in reaching an SCE
determination. The Menthol200 and Truck Trailer Axle 20 1 cases esCode both abroad and in the United States, see Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to
Trade- The United States and the InternationalAntidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV.
491, 524-58 (1972); Myerson, supra note 80, at 188, n.130.
195. See COMPTROLLZR GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-5; 127 CONG. REC. $3782
(daily ed. April 9, 1981) (remarks accompanying S. 958).
196. See id.; COMVRMOLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 18-19.
197: See supra note 9.
198. The Heinz bill would do away with the alternative values currently available for
determining fair market value and use only the "lowest free-market price." Id. at S3784. See
supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
200. Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of China, 46 Fed. Reg. 3,258 (1981).
See supra notes 114-32 and accompanying text.
201. Truck Trailer Axle-and-Brake Assemblies from the Hungarian People's Republic,
46 Fed. Reg. 46,152 (1981). See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
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tablish that Congress should specifically address the issue of using a
sectoral or an overall economy approach to the SCE determination.
The economic realities of today's world favor a sectoral approach.2 02 State influence in the general economy is a reality in
every country,2 03 and a generalized SCE designation for particular
countries ignores economic reality and discriminates against countries which, although currently denominated SCEs, in fact have less
state control in particular sectors than do current non-SCE countries. Congress can and should also define Commerce's mode of
analysis on a sectoral SCE basis: Commerce should determine
whether the cost components of the particular producers in question are so distorted by direct or indirect state controls that adjustments to those prices cannot be made to allow their use in a fair
value determination.20 4 Specific statutory authorization of the sectoral approach might also reduce the time that Commerce must
devote to the SCE determination in each case.
2. Statutory requirementsfor all adjustments necessary to ensure comparability. One of the principal frustrations of the foreign
producers in the recent SCE cases 205 has been the inability or
refusal of Commerce to make necessary adjustments needed to
reach comparable United States and foreign market prices. While
the Heinz bill may reduce such problems by reducing reliance on a
surrogate economy approach, it makes no economic sense for the
administering authority to be able to arbitrarily reject particular
adjustments on the basis of real or imagined statutory constraints.
Instead, the statute should specifically instruct Commerce to make
every proposed adjustment that, under ordinary economic analysis,
would better ensure comparability.
3. Specific allowance for comparative advantage. Neither the
current SCE statute 0 6 and rules20 7 nor the Heinz bil 2 0 8 allows an

202. Compare with the approach taken by the EEC in Council Regulation of December
20, 1979, No. 3017/79, which incorporates a list of countries considered to have non-market
economies, thus completely eliminating the state-controlled economy controversy. See supra
note 184 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., the recommendations in the Comptroller General's Report, supra note
172.
205. See supra notes 11-107 and accompanying text.
206. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (Supp. III 1979).
207. 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1980).
208. See supra note 9.
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SCE, in any real sense, to enjoy true cost savings resulting from
production efficiencies. However, as noted, 09 such a "comparative
advantage" concept is basic to free markets and international trade
generally. Therefore, any amendment to the SCE provisions should
specifically allow adjustments to foreign market value reflecting
cost savings that result from production efficiencies, if such efficiencies can be demonstrated by the foreign producer. Such a proposal
could be added to the "lowest free-market price" provision of the
Heinz bill,2 10 and would correct the problem with that provision
21
noted in the Comptroller General's Report. '
There is a strong consensus, reinforced by Commerce's unsatisfactory experience in recent cases, favoring a major revision of the
SCE provisions of the Antidumping Act. While possible changes are
many, the two principles that should be paramount in a revision of
the SCE provisions are (1) greater conformity of the statute to the
realities of an increasingly diverse international economic environment, and (2) greater specificity of the parameters to be utilized by
the Department of Commerce in making the SCE determination.

209. See supra notes 169, 182 and accompanying text.
210. 127 CONG. REc. S3784 (daily ed. April 9, 1981).
211. CoMPrROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.

